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I argue that liberal democracy is still achievable in Poland for three reasons. First, the success of 
President Duda and PiS was a product of specific conditions existing in 2015. By utilizing their 
nationalist, populist platform and the lack of EU action to prevent the PiS government’s 
replacement of independent judges with party loyalists, PiS took advantage of the existing political 
environment in a way that will not be as easily replicated in the future. With increased pressure 
from the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and lost majority in the Polish Senate in 2019, the PiS 
government will have a weaker capacity to systematically undermine democratic norms and 
principles. Second, PiS’s influence over other democratic institutions is not as deeply-rooted as it 
is in the judiciary. The senate, media, electoral framework, and mass protests in Poland are largely 
independent and provide opposition groups with useful platforms to express discontent and even 
stop authoritarian legislation from passing, despite disadvantageous shifts in the playing field. 
Third, I argue that public opinion polls reveal that PiS is losing popular support and effective 
methods of appealing to Poles, suggesting cooperative opposition parties will become more 
competitive in future elections despite a somewhat polarized political environment. 
Keywords: Poland, PiS, democracy, populism, democratic backsliding 
Introduction 
 Poland’s democracy once represented a bright, optimistic example of democratization in a 
post-communist state. Liberal democratic values have dominated the beliefs of Polish citizens and 
the government ever since the Solidarity movement under communism. Poland’s undying 
commitment to the EU throughout countless delays in defining their membership requirements 
further solidified their status as a successfully consolidated, post-communist, Central Eastern 
European (CEE) liberal democracy. Unlike Romania and Bulgaria, Poland’s rapid yet peaceful 
transition from communism to democracy gave them an upper hand at economically and 
institutionally recovering from the drastic shift to Western capitalism and democratic values. Yet, 
the right-wing ethnopopulist Law and Justice party (PiS) quickly abandoned this modern Polish 
tradition of liberal democracy after they took control of the government in the fateful 2015 Polish 
elections. The damages inflicted by PiS and its leadership to the democratic institutions of Poland 
in the immediate years following their 2015 victory were both vast and deeply-scarring; still, they 
merely signified the beginning of Poland’s democratic backsliding. After the subsequent elections 
in 2020, President Duda’s re-election further deteriorated the party influence and cooperative 
power of Polish opposition against PiS and now threatens the future survival of liberal democracy 
in Poland.  
 How, then, did the PiS government undermine Poland’s democratic institutions and 
manage to win reelection after their initial victory via a relatively free and fair process? Once 
President Duda and PiS took office in 2015, they quickly moved to weaken the Constitutional 
Tribunal (CT), Poland’s highest court, and many other parts of the judicial branch with illiberal 
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tactics that put party-loyal appointees in control. Despite the presence of federal checks and 
balances and the influence of the EU, President Duda and PiS also managed to avoid immediate 
legal consequences for their obvious display of illiberal, authoritarian motives in dismantling 
Poland’s court system. Furthermore, it is important to consider what other democratic institutions 
have been undermined by PiS, and if any are still independent and strong enough to oppose these 
anti-democratic pressures. Given how much PiS has already eroded Poland’s liberal democratic 
institutions, what are the pathways for reversing this damage? Why does Poland have a better 
chance at recovering its liberal democracy than Hungary? 
 I argue that liberal democracy is still achievable in Poland for three reasons. First, the 
success of President Duda and PiS was a product of specific conditions existing in 2015. By 
utilizing their nationalist, populist platform and the lack of EU action to prevent the PiS 
government’s replacement of independent judges with party loyalists, PiS took advantage of the 
existing political environment in a way that will not be as easily replicated in the future. With 
increased pressure from the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and lost majority in the Polish Senate 
in 2019, the PiS government will have a weaker capacity to systematically undermine democratic 
norms and principles. Second, PiS’s influence over other democratic institutions is not as deeply-
rooted as it is in the judiciary. The senate, media, electoral framework, and mass protests in Poland 
are largely independent and provide opposition groups with useful platforms to express discontent 
and even stop authoritarian legislation from passing, despite disadvantageous shifts in the playing 
field. Third, I argue that public opinion polls reveal that PiS is losing popular support and effective 
methods of appealing to Poles, suggesting cooperative opposition parties will become more 
competitive in future elections despite a somewhat polarized political environment. 
 I draw on news articles from 2015 to the present. I also use Freedom House’s analytical 
brief on the capture of Polish courts alongside other scholarly journal articles that address the PiS 
government’s effect on individual rights, society, and party landscape of Poland. To measure 
public opinion, I include data from EUobserver’s surveys recorded by Listen to Europe, the 2019 
Chapel Hill Expert Survey, and Pew Research Center’s survey results in 2019. 
 The rest of this paper is divided into 3 parts. First, I sketch the emergence and eventual 
victory of PiS in 2015. I explain how the Constitutional Tribunal was strategically paralyzed and 
dismantled by PiS while avoiding ramifications from federal regulators and the EU. Second, I 
consider which democratic institutions are still strong and independent after PiS’s occupation of 
the judiciary and which institutions have been the most restricted or threatened. Third, I contrast 
Poland’s democratic trajectory after the 2019 elections with the situation in Hungary, a country 
often rendered as the prime example of CEE democratic backsliding. I then conclude whether or 
not we will see a return to liberal democracy in Poland.  
Dismantling the Constitutional Tribunal 
 Before PiS leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski launched his extraconstitutional attack on the CT, 
PiS first won a surprising victory in the 2015 Polish parliamentary election. This was the first time 
a single-party government was formed with a 51% parliamentary majority, rather than a coalition 
formed through negotiation and compromise between parties (Markowski, 2018). These results 
can be attributed to large shifts in the voter bases of various parties and in PiS’s tactics that created 
a ‘supply-side revolt’ against democracy. The deciding factor in the electoral outcome was not 
from a change in Polish voters’ ideologies and party loyalties, which would be indicative of a 
political “demand side revolt” (Markowski, 2018). The significant loss in voter shares of the 
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center-liberal Civic Platform party and the left-wing Polish Peasant party made a coalition 
formation to contest PiS more difficult. This election was not “a landslide victory for PiS, and 
[not] indicative of a fundamental change in the political preferences of Poles” (Markowski, 2018), 
as PiS only increased their votes by 2% compared to a 1% change in the results for the Civic 
Platform party and other liberal competitors. Furthermore, prevailing public opinion on individual 
economic wellbeing at the time was relatively positive, so the economy itself was not the leading 
cause of the incumbent’s loss (Markowski, 2018). Rather, it was the ethnopopulist rhetoric against 
Poland’s “corrupt elites” and the abstract evaluations of Poland’s economy as a “country in ruins” 
that gave PiS a foundation to further illiberal solutions through manipulative tactics (Markowski, 
2018). The framing of the PiS campaign to radically oppose existing party platforms and reshape 
Polish voters’ perspectives on political realities through ethnopopulist rhetoric reveals a “classical 
‘supply side’ nationalistic/authoritarian/conservative revolution” (Markowski, 2018). By winning 
the 2015 election through supply-side, illiberal tactics, PiS solidified their status as an 
ethnopopulist government that would defend the “will of the Polish people” and discredit any 
opposition to their sole interpretation of this will.  
 Kaczynski and PiS quickly targeted the CT after the election, wasting no time in setting 
the authoritarian precedence that “… no state authority, including the Constitutional Tribunal, can 
disregard [their] legislation” (Davies, 2018). After a long history of the CT striking down previous 
PiS policies on media regulation, the newly-elected government was resolute to begin their rapid 
dismantling process by denying and replacing opposition-appointed judges with party puppets. As 
Christian Davies of Freedom House reports, “President Duda refused to swear in five Tribunal 
judges appointed during the last sitting of the outgoing parliament – despite the fact that he had no 
legal authority to do so” (Davies, 2018). Although the CT ordered the PiS-controlled parliament 
not to make any new appointments until they assessed President Duda’s situation, the parliament 
did so anyways right before the rulings returned that only 3 of the 5 appointed judges were 
constitutional (Davies, 2018). After the parliament refused to recognize the CT’s legitimacy in 
their rulings on the appointments, pressure between the two branches continued to build until Judge 
Rzepliński’s term ended. After stalling the Court’s nomination of a successor to Judge Rzepliński 
by having his loyal party appointees all call in “sick” on the day of the vote, President Duda 
established an interim president for the court and presided over the new vote. Instead of including 
all the judges for this new vote, President Duda swore in a new PiS judge with only six of the 
judges and his interim court president present, thus giving PiS a majority in the CT (Davies, 2018). 
Once the CT had been successfully overrun by PiS-appointed judges, the government began 
massively restructuring the Supreme Court, the National Council of the Judiciary (KRS), and other 
lower courts. After initial proposals, President Duda and PiS dismantled and paralyzed these courts 
by terminating the terms of existing judges, giving the Parliament the right to nominate 
replacements, forcing all Supreme Court justices over 65 to retire, and introducing the ability to 
reopen and hear any final judgments since 1997 (Davies, 2018).  
 After this authoritarian takeover and paralysis of the Polish judiciary system, the European 
Commission made demands for President Duda and the PiS-led parliament to reverse and reform 
their actions through sanction procedures under Article 7. In defiance of the European 
Commission’s report and broader EU membership conditions, the Polish incumbents instead 
published a 94-page “White Paper” defending themselves and floating superficial concessions that 
did not remedy PiS’s systematic influence over the judicial branch (Davies, 2018). The EU 
currently plans to impose further sanctions through the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and to cut 
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some of the funds from the Cohesion Policy and CAP to Poland, but suffers from delayed 
negotiations and complications from Brexit (Harper, 2019). For now, President Duda and PiS 
incumbents have successfully gotten away with undermining the CT and the Polish judiciary 
system more broadly. 
 The potential for future dismantling of Poland’s judiciary is not as likely now as compared 
to President Duda and PiS’s initial success in the CT in 2015. Unlike in Hungary, the Polish 
parliament did not introduce any constitutional restrictions on the CT. While Fidesz restricted the 
power of the Hungarian constitutional court on fiscal matters and scrutiny of amendments, PiS 
only took control of the CT through a majority of seats occupied by party loyalists. This means 
any constitutional restrictions imposed on the CT would be counter-productive to the role of PiS 
loyalists in further legitimizing their illiberal authority in the Parliament and the Presidency 
(Sadurski, 2018). European authorities will also be watching Poland much more closely, 
particularly the ECJ. In 2019 alone, the ECJ ruled some PiS reforms illegal, such as allowing the 
president to personally grant 5-year extensions to Supreme Court judges’ retirements, and lowering 
the retirement age of judges in general courts to 60 for women and 65 for men (Walsh, 2019). 
While PiS’s initial success in dismantling the Polish judiciary system was both rapid and 
destructive, President Duda and PiS are not in a position to restrict the constitutional authority of 
the courts and can only maintain a party-empowering judiciary through a majority of seats held by 
loyal PiS judges in the CT, Supreme Court, and KRS. 
The Survival of Polish Liberal Democratic Institutions 
 After 2015, President Duda and PiS leaders successfully maintained a dominant party 
majority in the Parliament, CT, Supreme Court, and KRS. This dominance in the Polish 
government gave PiS significant leverage over various additional institutions, allowing them to 
further dissolve liberal democratic values in Poland. Despite systemic disadvantages, many 
important institutions and political outlets such as protests and the media remain independent of 
PiS influence today. The independence of key institutions serves as a valuable asset to opposition 
groups and safeguards against further erosion of liberal democratic structures in Poland. The 
senate, electoral framework, media, and ‘Black Protests’ prove that Polish citizens can and will 
defend liberal democracy from further erosion by resisting PiS takeover and directly stopping 
restrictive, authoritarian laws from passing.  
 The collective opposition parties’ control over the Senate after 2019 is a great example of 
recent resistance to PiS takeover. President Duda’s reelection in 2020 largely signified a failure 
“of Poland’s leading opposition parties to hold Law and Justice effectively to account” (Davies, 
2020). Similar to the 2015 election, Polish opposition parties were unable to cooperate together 
and beat President Duda in the 2020 Polish presidential election, once again failing to secure a 
traditional party victory against the ethnopopulist PiS. The most damning piece of evidence was 
general public opinion towards the Civic Platform’s nominee Rafał Trzaskowski, as over 30% of 
Poles answered “don’t know” in regard to their thoughts on Trzaskowski’s favorability (European 
Movement International, 2019). While party influence and opposition cooperation has grown 
weaker in the face of PiS, the 2019 election also showed the first signs of weakness in PiS 
incumbents’ abilities to maintain seats and control the entire Polish government. An opposition 
coalition successfully captured 51 of the 100 total seats in the Polish senate, the less powerful 
upper-house of Polish parliament (Cienski and Wanat, 2019). The PiS-controlled Sejm, the lower-
house of parliament, can still override any delays or amendments by the senate with an absolute 
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majority. Nonetheless, the senate is still responsible for nominating key officials, which will 
“undermine PiS’s attempts to put all government institutions under its control” (Cienski and 
Wanat, 2019). Since PiS derives the majority of its power and institutional influence through sheer 
majorities in number of seats rather than overtly-illiberal restrictions in the constitution, the 
opposition’s control over the senate marks a valuable victory in the survival of existing democratic 
institutions in Poland. The fact that opposition parties can still win seat majorities in a branch of 
parliament suggests that PiS has not been able to fully dismantle the safeguards of Poland’s liberal 
democracy.  
 Alongside the results of the 2019 election, reports also indicated a relatively strong 
electoral framework was still present in Poland. Freedom House found that Poland’s electoral 
framework “generally ensured free and fair elections” despite President Duda’s changes to the 
electoral code that allowed the parliament to nominate some members of the National Electoral 
Commission (Freedom House, 2019). The OSCE also determined that “… the elections were 
generally conducted in a ‘professional and transparent’ manner” (Freedom House, 2019). Some 
concerns persist over regulations on campaigning with state resources and a lack of impartiality in 
the public media, but Polish elections largely remained free and fair during PiS’s first term. A new 
PiS threat to the electoral framework could be in the vulnerability of the easily politicized Chamber 
of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs, which has the authority “to validate or reject election 
and referendum results” (Freedom House, 2019). Yet, after PiS requested votes to be recounted in 
their lost Senate races, the Polish Supreme Court did not overturn any of the results. Despite 
existing vulnerabilities to PiS politics, the Polish electoral framework has not yet been fully 
undermined through delegitimized election results and party-loyal Commission nominations from 
the PiS Parliament. 
 Unlike the senate and elections, Polish independent media was and still is the liberal 
democratic institution most threatened by PiS. While most privately-owned media outlets continue 
to operate independently thanks to support from foreign ownerships, public media was entirely 
purged of independent voices after PiS took power in 2015 (Freedom House, 2019). The Polish 
public television broadcaster, TVP, quickly became an active propaganda tool and even openly 
supported the PiS campaign in 2019. Most notably, PiS and the TVP tried to sue Professor 
Wojciech Sadurski for civil and criminal defamation over tweets he made regarding the public 
media’s corruption (Ticher, 2020). In Sadurski’s words, the TVP “has become an active instrument 
of PiS propaganda, engaging in grotesque glorification of the party and vilification of its 
opponents” (Sadurski, 2019). Despite public media’s complete takeover by PiS, private media 
outlets have stayed independent from party influence. The PiS leadership has made claims to 
“repolonise” private media, or reduce foreign ownership in Polish media and assure a purely 
“Polish point of view” is portrayed, instead of foreign-owned outlets having a “conflict of interest” 
in their perspectives (Shotter, 2019). The true intent of PiS in calling for reductions in foreign 
ownership of private media is more focused on eliminating opposing political views across Polish 
media, as foreign-owned private media outlets are usually the loudest voices against the PiS 
government (Freedom House, 2019). In what is a positive sign for the survival of liberal democracy 
in Poland, PiS has not yet passed any of these “repolonising” laws, so private media currently 
survives as an independent, democratic institution that allows dissenting voices against the PiS 
government to be heard.  
 One of the most powerful instances of successful resistance to PiS influence can be seen in 
the waves of Polish ‘Black Protests’. Starting in June 2016, the ‘Stop Abortion’ project launched 
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with the goal of reforming abortion laws in Poland. Gaining support from both PiS and the Roman 
Catholic Church, a petition backing ‘Stop Abortion’ gained over 450,000 signatures and had to be 
put to a vote in parliament as a ‘citizens’ project’ (Szelegieniec, 2018). Alternatively, the ‘Save 
Women’ organization launched an “opposing campaign in favor of liberalizing abortion laws” that 
garnered over 250,000 signatures (Szelegieniec, 2018). Although both campaigns were voted on 
in Parliament at the same time, the PiS majority rejected the ‘Save Women’ project but advanced 
the ‘Stop Abortion’ campaign into the commission stage (Szelegieniec, 2018). During all of this, 
massive demonstrations, known as ‘Black Protests’ for the all-black attire of demonstrators, came 
in waves against both the initial ‘Stop Abortion’ proposal and its subsequent victory in passing a 
Parliamentary vote. On October 3rd alone, over 250,000 men and women joined the Women’s 
Strike, a part of the broader second wave of Black Protests, and inspired solidarity actions for 
women’s rights across Poland and in other countries like Argentina and South Korea (Szelegieniec, 
2018). More importantly, the protests pressured PiS to step back and not vote further on the ‘Stop 
Abortion’ project for the remainder of their first term. The success of the Black Protests at halting 
PiS from passing anti-abortion legislations shows how vulnerable PiS is “in the face of mass 
resistance” (Szelegieniec, 2018).  Throughout multiple waves of demonstrations, the Polish Black 
Protests successfully stopped the PiS government from passing illiberal abortion bans despite their 
control over Parliament with a majority of seats. Moreover, mass mobilization as an independent 
institution is strong enough to resist PiS influence and actively defend from PiS’s attempts to 
undermine liberal democracy. 
Hungary’s Desperate Situation and Poland’s Future Potential  
  Hungary and Poland are a valuable pair of Central Eastern European states to use for 
comparisons, as their democracies share almost identical roots in communist opposition and post-
communist development. Both states are also experiencing serious democratic backsliding in 
modern times, but to somewhat different degrees. Most notably, these states varied in how 
ethnopopulist parties in Hungary and Poland, Fidesz and PiS respectively, successfully polarized 
their political systems. Ethnopopulist parties benefit from polarization within the prevailing party 
system of their state, as “a polarized society can help ethnopopulists come to power – and, as 
incumbents, ethnopopulists pursue strategies to deepen polarization” (Vachudova, 2020). Since 
ethnopopulists wish to consolidate power solely for the sake of “the people”, polarizing themselves 
through increasingly radical appeals, such as anti-establishment and anti-Muslim trends 
(Blackington and Vachudova, 2020), helps put opposition parties in a challenging position to reject 
ethnopopulist claims and simultaneously appeal to distrusting voters. 
 As previously discussed, Polish opposition parties have been greatly undermined by the 
illiberal PiS government and have struggled to effectively cooperate and prevent President Duda’s 
re-election in 2020. However, the success of opposition parties in capturing a collective majority 
in the Senate proved that cooperation against PiS is still possible. The cooperation of opposition 
parties in Poland reveals an important distinction from Hungary in their response to an 
ethnopopulist party in control of their government. As Dr. Milada Anna Vachudova and Courtney 
Blackington determined, opposition parties faced with ethnopopulist competition must decide 
“whether to cooperate or compete with each other” (Blackington and Vachudova, 2020). Unlike 
Polish opposition’s attempts at party cooperation, opposition parties in Hungary instead “compete 
with one another rather than merging or building electoral coalitions” (Blackington and 
Vachudova, 2020). Hungarian political parties also suffer from much deeper polarization along 
“regime divides”, as seen in the 2019 Chapel Hill Expert Survey data on anti-establishment and 
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anti-Muslim rhetoric in various European states with significant ethnopopulist presences 
(Blackington and Vachudova, 2020). Opposition parties in both Hungary and Poland face serious 
polarization and competition against dominant ethnopopulist incumbents, but the continued efforts 
of Polish opposition parties to cooperate and reclaim majorities in government put them in a better 
position to resist illiberal tactics than Hungarian opposition parties. 
 Opinion polls are another indicator that public support of PiS is weakening and that 
opposition parties have the capacity to retake control of the Polish government. Listen to Europe’s 
opinion polls on civil society and feelings towards key actors indicated a weakening outlook on 
PiS incumbent’s overall approval. President Duda’s rating by surveyed Poles showed signs of 
polarization, either being “somewhat favorable” or “very unfavorable” (European Movement 
International, 2019). This may seem like more polarization is taking place in Poland, which could 
threaten opposition capabilities, but a comparison with similar Hungarian opinion polls reveal a 
much worse state of polarization caused by Viktor Orbán and Fidesz. In a 2017 report by the IRI, 
38% of Hungarians said that, overall, Hungary is heading in the right direction, while 58% saw 
Hungary heading in the wrong direction (IRI, 2017). Conversely, PiS leader Kaczynski had nearly 
half of the surveyed Poles rate him as “very unfavorable”, which indicates significantly less 
polarization and a broader disillusionment with PiS’s ethnopopulist platform among Poles 
(European Movement International, 2019). These public opinion results may not be a clear 
indication of Poland’s greater potential to return to liberal democracy, but are an important factor 
that further widens the difference in public attitudes towards Poland and Hungary’s levels of 
democratic backsliding. 
 Another important opinion poll by Pew Research Center revealed clear differences among 
European countries in their attitudes towards the EU and democracy, as well as their perception of 
economic prosperity. On average, the majority of Europeans disagreed with the statement “Most 
elected officials care about what people like me think”, but only 48% of Poles disagreed versus 
71% of Hungarians (Wike et al., 2019). Additionally, Poland showed more positive attitudes 
towards the EU than Hungary, with 84% of Poles saying they “Have a favorable view of the EU” 
as opposed to 67% of Hungarians (Wike et al., 2019). These results give us insight into the political 
capacity of Poles, since they have more positive outlooks on their current political setting than 
Hungarians. There is greater potential for Poles to resist further democratic backsliding from PiS 
than Hungarians from Fidesz, particularly if PiS were to directly attack their current status in the 
EU while opposition leaders inversely champion the stance of everyday citizens better than PiS. 
This potential is further supported through Pew Research Center’s survey results on the current 
and future economic prosperity of European countries. They reported 57% of Poles say “children 
today will be better off financially compared to their parents” and 74% say “the economic situation 
in their country is good”, while only 37% and 52% of Hungarians supported the same statements 
respectively (Wike et al., 2019). As previously mentioned, the ethnopopulist appeal by PiS towards 
economic reform was not based on actual economic hardship, but rather a claim to one’s “fair 
share” in the economy. Since economic satisfaction and expected prosperity are growing in Poland 
today, the ethnopopulist appeal by PiS will likely become less effective as younger generations 
grow up in economic prosperity. Overall, the positive outlook of Poles, as seen in most public 
opinion results and contrasted with that of Hungarians, reveals a far greater potential in Poland for 
the competitiveness of opposition parties to succeed against PiS, especially if ethnopopulists 
continue to undermine liberal democratic values and institutions in Poland. 
 




 After President Duda’s reelection in 2019, Professor Agnieszka Graff claimed that “right 
now it really feels like it’s game over” (Davies, 2020). However, in this paper, I argue that Poland 
is far from reaching the final stages of dismantling democracy despite such efforts by PiS since 
2015. The quick and unique attack on democratic institutions by paralyzing the CT and dismantling 
the Polish judiciary in 2015 will not be so easily replicated by PiS in the future. Poland’s various 
other institutions have held on to their independence and have a significant potential to both 
survive and maintain liberal democratic traditions. Lastly, the differences in Hungarian and Polish 
ethnopopulists’ successes in polarizing their people show just how much potential the Polish 
citizens have to mobilize around and capitalize on the competitive potential of cooperative 
opposition groups. Democracy in Poland suffered a heavy blow in 2015, but did not fall into 
complete authoritarian control and can still revitalize its liberal democratic values before PiS 
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